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 Let us briefly recap the conclusions of the arguments of the preceding chapters.   Kantian 
and utilitarian traditions of moral thought generate compelling support for the conclusion that the 
state should protect liberty of conscience under the rubric of principled toleration. But there 
appears to be no equally principled argument that picks out distinctively religious conscience as 
an object of special moral and legal solicitude.  If liberty of conscience is morally important, then 
what should we do with respect to the extant law of religious liberty, which treats religious 
conscience as more important than any other kind—sometimes, as in America, de jure and 
always, as in every other Western democracy, de facto?   
 Remember, of course, what is at stake in this question.   The constitutional and statutory 
provisions that encode religious toleration provide that individuals with claims of religious 
conscience can request, and sometimes secure, exemptions from generally applicable laws, an 
opportunity unavailable to the individual with a “merely” secular claim of conscience.  Given the 
lack of any good moral reason for treating the non-religious unequally with regard to claims of 
conscience, one obvious solution would be to extend the breadth of exemptions from generally 
applicable laws to all claims of conscience, religious or not.  If a boy‟s Sikh religion requires him 
to bring a knife to school, then he should be eligible for an exemption from the law forbidding 
students from carrying potential weapons.  But if another rural boy‟s family tradition, going back 
five generations, passed down from father to son as a sacred rite of passage to manhood, 
demands that a young man after reaching puberty must always carry his hunting knife with him, 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1748699
then that boy too should have a colorable claim for exemption from the ban on weapons in 
school.  And what then of the lone eccentric, who for reasons known only to him, feels a 
categorical compulsion, as a matter of the deepest personal integrity, to always have a knife 
nearby—does he too have a claim for exemption as a matter of liberty of conscience? 
Universal Exemptions for Conscience:  Four Objections 
 From a principled point of view, there may be no difference among all the preceding 
claims of conscience,
1
 but it is a virtual certainty that no legal system will embrace this 
capacious approach to liberty of conscience which would involve according all these claims of 
conscience equal legal standing.   In the first instance, it would be tantamount to 
constitutionalizing a right to civil disobedience,
2
 a posture it is hard to imagine any legal system 
adopting.  What legal system will say:  this is the law, but, of course, you have the right to 
disregard it on grounds of conscience?  This would appear to amount to a legalization of 
anarchy! 
Yet the very possibility of a legal system that constitutionalizes civil disobedience is--as 
the phrase “legalization of anarchy” suggests--probably conceptually incoherent.3  It is a truism 
of modern legal philosophy that all law claims authority, that is, it claims the right to tell its 
citizens what they must do with respect to the matters about which the law speaks.
4
  On Joseph 
Raz‟s influential account, this means that the law tries to preempt other kinds of considerations 
                                                 
1
 The Rawlsian and Millian arguments for liberty of conscience (considered in Chapter 1) might diverge in 
their treatment of these cases.   Mill‟s emphasis on the utilitarian value of different “experiments in living” is going 
to countenance a wider swath for claims of conscience than the Rawlsian approach, which arguably requires that the 
claims be backed by sufficiently serious moral and political reasons.  But even the character I call the “lone 
eccentric” might have such reasons (arguably Thoreau was such a „lone eccentric,‟ though not one specifically 
interested in knives!).   
2
 I owe this way of putting the point to Michael White. 
3
 I hear bracket my official skepticism about “conceptual incoherence” as an argumentative strategy in 
philosophy, on the ground that I can see no a posteriori considerations that would favor countenancing the revisions 
to the concept of law that would be required.  See my Naturalizing Jurisprudence (Oxford:  Oxford University 
Press, 2007), pp. __-___. 
4
 See generally, Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1986). 
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about what ought to be done, which would include any considerations that might be deemed 
“reasons of conscience.”5   The law says, “Do not carry a weapon into school,” it does not say, 
“Do not carry a weapon into school, unless you have a really important reason for doing so,” 
such as a demand of conscience.   Obviously the law may include explicit exceptions to the 
prohibition in question--for example, for law enforcement officers--but concrete exceptions to a 
general rule are very different from a generic “opt out” clause that “constitutionalizing” civil 
disobedience would provide.  The problem with the proposed broad “exception for conscience,” 
given the Razian account of authority, is that it would no longer be intelligible what the law 
requires, since every legal command would be of the form, “Do X, unless you have a 
conscientious [or very weighty] reason not to.”  Rather than the law being what Raz calls an 
“exclusionary” (or preempting) reason for acting one way rather than another, it would become 
merely an invitation to deliberate about what ought to be done.  The law‟s claim of authority is 
often not justified, to be sure, but that is not the issue here.  The issue, rather, is that it is central 
to the very idea of a legal system that it claims authority, and to claim authority is to claim the 
right to say what ought to be done, not to invite a dialogue with every individual‟s conscience 
about what ought to be done.   A constitutional right to civil disobedience is tantamount to a 
denial of the law‟s claim to authority, that is, to its very claim to be law.   It would not only invite 
anarchy, it would be an effective admission that there is no law, that the rule of individual 
conscience is the status quo. 
Notice that the existing regime of exemptions for claims of religious conscience in most 
Western democracies does not pose a similar problem because religious reasons for not 
complying with a law are only a subset of all the reasons that might bear on what we ought to 
                                                 
5
 We can set the bar for what counts as genuine “reasons of conscience” as high as we like, that does not 
affect the argument. 
do, the latter being the reasons that the law tries to preempt in claiming the authority to tell us 
what we ought to do.   A law that says, “You must do X, unless you have a religious reason of 
conscience not to” is still quite intelligible, except perhaps in the odd case where the law rests 
only on religious reasons.  Yet even in that latter case, it will still be intelligible what must be 
done assuming the law includes (legislatively or through judicial decision) a specification of 
what counts as “religious” reasons of conscience (much as the law against carrying a weapon in 
school is not rendered unintelligible because there is an exception for law enforcement officers, a 
category that is otherwise defined
6
).  By contrast, in a scheme of universal exemptions for 
“reasons of conscience” (however weighty we imagine they must be), every law is literally 
meaningless, since every reason for acting the law might preempt is, in fact, available as a 
ground for acting otherwise to a person of “conscience.”   It is possible, of course, that a 
particular legal system might define the scope of reasons of conscience in such a way that a 
system of putatively universal exemptions for conscience became more like a regime of 
exemptions for matters of religious conscience.   But in that scenario, there is not, really, a 
general exemption for claims of conscience, but only for some subset of those claims that the law 
chooses to recognize. 
 The preceding may be jurisprudentially interesting points about the nature of law, but 
there is a far more mundane, practical reason why no legal system is going to embrace a 
“constitutional right to civil disobedience” in the form of a general liberty of conscience, 
whatever its pedigree or character.  Claims of conscience present hard evidential issues for 
                                                 
6
 Something similar can be said about the exception to the rule against the use of deadly force in cases of 
self-defense.   Notice, first, that self-defense is only justified against illegal use of force, whereas those claiming an 
exemption for reasons of conscience are claiming that against lawful action.  Second, the self-defense exception is 
also defined in most jurisdictions, and not simply a matter “up for grabs” in reasoning about what ought to be done:  
it is more like the exception for “law enforcement officers” with respect to carrying weapons in school than it is like 
a generic exemption from every law if there is a reason of conscience. 
courts, and their correct resolution is important since what is at stake is the very ability of the 
community to enforce its laws of general applicability.   From the epistemic standpoint, the great 
virtue of claims of religious conscience is that they typically provide evidential proxies for 
conscience that are much easier for courts to assess.  A claim of conscience is, after all, a claim 
about what one must do, no matter what--not as a matter of crass self-interest, but because it is a 
kind of moral imperative central to one‟s integrity as a person, to the meaning of one‟s life.   But 
how are courts to determine whether someone‟s claim to defy the law is really a claim of 
conscience?   That is the specter that haunts any legal regime governing liberty of conscience, 
and the great practical advantage of a regime which privileges liberty of religious conscience is 
that it gives courts a more robust evidential base for their determinations. After all, a litigant who 
asserts a claim of religious conscience must reference a religion.  Religions typically have texts 
and doctrines and commands, either written or passed down orally among many adherents.   
Membership in the religion in question usually depends (as Durkheim‟s account of religion 
correctly noticed
7
)  on participation in practices and rituals and ceremonies.   All of this gives 
the courts a rich evidential base for assessing the genuineness of a claim of conscience.  Rather 
than trying to peer into the depths of a man‟s soul, the court can simply weigh oral and textual 
evidence about the religion‟s doctrines and its requirements, as well as the evidence that the 
claimant in question really was a member of the religion, as reflected in his participation in the 
relevant practice and rituals.
8
   
                                                 
7
 See the discussion in Chapter 2, supra pp. __-__. 
8
 It is true that in the United States, the Supreme Court has held that, “The guarantee of free exercise is not 
limited to beliefs which are shared by all of the members of a religious sect,” Thomas v. Review Board of the 
Indiana Employment Security Division, 450 U.S. 707, 715 (1981), and has affirmed that the “sincerity” of the belief 
is ultimately decisive.  Yet even Thomas involved someone who was clearly a Jehovah‟s Witness, though one whose 
faith happened to demand of him actions that other Jehovah‟s Witnesses did not view as mandatory.   Of course, we 
saw something similar in the Canadian case of Multani:  not all Sikhs thought it was essential to carry a real knife, 
yet the Canadian Supreme Court upheld the exemption for those Sikhs who thought the actual knife essential to 
religious observance.   In these, and similar cases, the courts still rely on evidence of an organized religion, and its 
 These evidential considerations might suggest a compromise posture, short of extending 
exemptions from generally applicable laws to all claims of conscience, no matter how individual 
(or idiosyncratic).  Recognizing the epistemic problem—that courts must adjudicate whether a 
claim of conscience is really a claim of conscience—perhaps we should simply extend legal 
protection for liberty of conscience only to claims of conscience that are rooted in communal or 
group traditions and practices that mimic, from an evidential point of view, those of religious 
groups?
9
   Think of the vigorous and vocal groups now common in affluent capitalist societies 
that promote veganism or animal rights.  Many vegans, for example, regard the appropriation 
and consumption (as food or otherwise) of non-human animals as morally odious, akin to the 
chattel slavery of humans.
10
  Organized as these individuals are into ideological and advocacy 
(and even sometimes revolutionary
11
) groups, it is easy enough to find many of the same kinds of 
evidentiary markers of a genuine claim of conscience as in the case of a religious claimant.  So 
why not give the vegan prisoner, with bona fide involvements in the animal liberation 
“movement,” legal standing to claim exemption from dietary and/or prison work regimens that 
would violate his conscientious objection to the exploitation of non-human animals? 
                                                                                                                                                             
requirements (even if not universal), in assessing the validity of the claims.  We see something similar at work in the 
U.S. Supreme Court decision in Frazee v. Illinois Department of Employment Security, 489 U.S. 829 (1989), 
notwithstanding the surface rhetoric of the opinion affirming that a claimant need not attach his claim of conscience 
to any particular religious sect and its doctrines.   Yet Mr. Frazee did affirm that he was a “Christian” and he sought 
exemption in connection with his observance of the familiar Christian Sabbath, Sunday.  On both fronts then, his 
claim was easily recognizable as a religious one in a Christian-majority society like the United States. 
9
 Other epistemic devices are, of course, also possible, to try to better calibrate exemptions with those who 
have genuine claims of conscience.  Laws, for example, might impose different burdens on those seeking 
exemptions, as a way of  identifying those with a genuine claim of conscience (e.g., someone seeking an exemption 
from one year of military service might have to undertake, instead, two years of alternative civil service).   It seems 
unlikely, of course, that any alternative measures are going to resolve the epistemic problem, and they will still be 
vulnerable to the Rousseauian worry discussed, below. 
10
 See, e.g., Gary L. Francione, Animal Rights and Animal Welfare, 48 Rutgers L Rev 397 (1996). 
11
 See, e.g., Christine M. Jackson, The Fiery Fight for Animal Rights, Hastings Center Report 19, no. 6 
(1989): 38 (discussing the radical tactics of certain animal rights groups, including the Animal Liberation Front). 
Notice, of course, that there is no principled reason for expanding exemptions this way; 
the proposal is motivated entirely by the practical and epistemic worries noted above.   This 
approach would have the virtue of not treating only claims of religious conscience as legally 
special, when there is no good moral reason to do so.   But it would also have the unwelcome 
consequence of treating genuine claims of conscience unequally before the law, simply based on 
how practicable it is for courts to adjudicate their genuineness, and nothing else.   Organized 
vegans would have legal standing, but not Henry Thoreau or his 21
st
-century analogue.   
Is the unfairness of such inequality justifiable?  Should we not simply concede that the 
success of any claim at law depends on the ability to prove one‟s entitlement, and leave it at 
that?
12
  Some accused are wrongfully convicted of crimes, but that does not mean that the right 
of criminal defendants to prove their innocence constitutes an injustice.   If everyone at least has 
a right to establish a claim of conscience demanding an exemption, why should it matter, 
morally, that not everyone can prove the genuineness of his or her claim equally well (or equally 
easily)? 
We may put the challenge even more starkly.  Those innocent of a crime with which they 
are charged are entitled to be acquitted, and it is an injustice if they are convicted instead.  But 
that injustice does not entail that it is unjust (because unequal) to establish a system of criminal 
justice administration in which defendants must try to prove their innocence.   Those with a 
genuine claim of conscience are also entitled (in a legal regime with universal exemptions for 
claims of conscience) to an exemption; it is an injustice if they are denied the exemption, but that 
does not mean the system of universal exemptions is morally objectionable.  Is there any 
pertinent difference between the two cases? 
                                                 
12
 I am grateful to David Strauss for pressing a version of this objection. 
The difference turns, I suspect, on matters of degree regarding the ease, or difficulty, of 
proof.  If it were extremely difficult for most of those charged with certain kinds of crimes to 
prove their innocence, such that many innocent defendants were regularly convicted despite their 
lack of culpability, then a complaint about unequal treatment seems to me to have moral force.  
The objection then would be that the standards of proof had been calibrated in such a way to 
entail unequal treatment of too many defendants similarly situated in terms of culpability.  This 
will entail a judgment about matters of degree, to repeat, and it is possible that a scheme of 
universal exemptions for claims of conscience, with suitable evidential standards, might do well 
enough to blunt the inequality objection.  In that event, the inequality of treatment of claims of 
conscience is not necessarily fatal to a scheme of universal exemptions for claims of conscience. 
It bears noticing, however, that a fourth difficulty with such a scheme of exemptions 
looms, one that is quite independent of the question of proof.
13
  For exemptions from generally 
applicable laws often impose burdens on those who have no claim of exemption.  Think of 
mandatory military service:  if those with claims of conscience against military duty are 
exempted from service, then the burden (and all the very serious risks) will fall upon those who 
either have no conscientious objection or can not successfully establish their conscientious claim.  
Let us call this, for ease of reference, the “Rousseauian” worry about exemptions.  If general 
compliance with laws is necessary to promote the “general welfare” or the “common good,” then 
selective exemptions from those laws is a morally objectionable injury to the general welfare.  
To be sure, not every law from which exemptions might be sought will impede the lawful pursuit 
of the general welfare, but most will--whether it is exemptions from zoning regulations for 
                                                 
13
 Here I am indebted to Ben Laurence. 
religious institutions, exemptions from mandatory vaccination schemes, or exemptions from a 
ban on knives in the schools.
14
 
The “No Exemptions” Approach--and Its Problems 
 There is, to be sure, an alternative route suggested by the argument of the preceding 
chapters.  If there is no good moral reason to treat religious conscience as special, indeed, no 
reason (except practical and evidential) to treat communally-sanctioned claims of conscience as 
special, and if there are Rousseauian reasons pertainting to the general welfare for the state to 
enact and enforce its laws, then perhaps we should simply abandon the idea that there should be 
exemptions from generally applicable laws?  To be sure, the state may not pass laws whose aim 
is to suppress claims of conscience—that would be inconsistent with principled toleration—but 
the state may, of course, pursue neutral objectives like the safety, health, and well-being of the 
populace.
15
   If we are not to unfairly privilege religious claims of conscience by allowing their 
adherents to opt out of neutral legal requirements, while non-religious conscientious claimants 
must bear the burden of defeat (or sanction, should they resist), and if we are not to impede 
realization of the general welfare by permitting some to opt out of societal burdens, then perhaps 
it is time to say:  the law is the law, and there will be no exemptions for claims of conscience, 
religious or otherwise?  (This does not prejudge the possibility that sometimes civil disobedience 
will be the morally appropriate response to the law, but that is a different issue.) 
                                                 
14
 The Rousseauian concern would also count against Kent Greenawalt‟s prima facie attractive proposal 
that exemptions should depend on how serious the violation of conscience would be for the claimant.  So, e.g., being 
forced to kill in war over one‟s conscientious objections seems more serious than denying an exemption for use of 
an otherwise illegal drug in a religious ritual.  See, e.g., __________________.    Assuming, again, that we can 
reliably resolve the epistemic problem of calibrating something like “degrees” of seriousness of a claim of 
conscience,  
15
 We will return to the question of what state purposes are actually neutral and permissible, below. 
Now eliminating all exemptions would, as Martha Nussbaum emphasizes,
16
 impose a 
burden on matters of minority conscience, since, for obvious reasons, societies are unlikely to 
create legal prohibitions that burden widely accepted demands of conscience, religious or 
otherwise.
17
   Insofar as there are more religious claims of conscience than non-religious 
claims—a distinct possibility in many societies—then imposing a No Exemptions regime will 
undoubtedly burden religious claims of conscience more than non-religious ones, and will 
burden minority claims of conscience, religious or otherwise, more than majority claims of 
conscience, religious or otherwise.  That certainly seems unfortunate and unfair, but is it more 
unfair than limiting the burden to minority claims of conscience that can not claim any religious 
authority on their behalf?  At least generally applicable laws unintentionally burden minority 
claims of conscience, whereas a regime of exemptions intentionally privileges religious claims of 
conscience, to the exclusion of others, even though there is no moral reason to do so.  If it is 
liberty of conscience simpliciter that has moral standing, then it is hard to see the moral force of 
a demand for purportedly equal treatment that arbitrarily selects some subset of claims of 
conscience for special consideration.
18
   
 We can also now see quite clearly the practical import of the issue raised in Chapter 4, 
that is, of deciding whether the moral foundation of liberty of conscience is toleration (what we 
there called “minimal respect”) or something more affirmative, like Appraisal Respect.   Those 
                                                 
16
 See Nussbaum, Liberty of Conscience, pp. __-__. 
17
 This will be true even in non-democratic societies, since the costs to an authoritarian society of 
controlling the population will prove overwhelming it if deviates to widely from accepted conscientious norms in 
the population. 
18
 Notice too that adopting a strong anti-establishment principle, along the lines of French laïcité, would 
not obviate the problem, which results not simply from government efforts to promote particular religions, but from 
the way in which the other regulatory actions of government will be insensitive to infringements upon matters of 
minority conscience, religious or otherwise.  But perhaps such burdens are the price of not treating religious 
conscience as special, when no principled argument could support that practice?  We return to the special problems 
posed by laïcité, below. 
 
practices which are proper objects of Appraisal Respect often do command exemptions from 
generally applicable laws.   Think of the tax-exempt status of charitable (including religious) 
organizations in American law.
19
  Because American society highly appraises charitable 
activities (a legal posture that has obvious ideological benefits in an economic system predicated 
on greed), they are exempt from the general rules pertaining to taxation.  More generally, we 
might think that attitudes and practices that warrant Appraisal Respect ought to command 
governmental solicitude and support, as opposed to “mere” toleration.  If religious claims of 
conscience were proper objects of Appraisal Respect—a thesis we rejected in Chapter 4--then a 
broad claim for exemptions would have more force than it does.  But if the only claim of 
conscience is for toleration, then it is not obvious why the state should subordinate its other 
morally important objectives—safety, health, well-being, equal treatment before the law—to 
claims of religious conscience. 
 The argument so far, may seem to have pressed towards the No Exemptions approach to 
claims of conscience, yet surely we must bear in mind that a regime of religious toleration also 
demands that the state not single out particular religions for persecution or coercive burdens.  To 
the extent burdens on conscience are incidental to the pursuit of legitimate state objectives, the 
No Exemptions approach poses no obstacle.   But if we adopt the No Exemptions approach as a 
matter of fairness—because religious claims of conscience have no greater entitlement to 
exemptions than non-religious claims of conscience—and because of Rousseiaun concerns about 
the general welfare, then surely we open the door to state conduct motivated by anti-religious 
animus, but under the pretense of legitimate, neutral objectives.  Are not sectarian bias and 
                                                 
19
The Internal Revenue Code states that “[c]orporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, 
organized and operated exclusively for  religious, charitable scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or 
educational purposes . . . and which does not participate in . . . any political compaign on behalf of (or in opposition 
to) any candidate for public office” is exempt from Federal income taxes.              I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). 
prejudice likely to co-opt principled arguments for unprincipled ends, a concern which seems 
particularly acute in the domain of religious liberty?
20
   
 Consider the controversy over the French ban on ostentatious religious symbols—such as 
the Muslim head scarf, or the Jewish skull cap, or large Christian crosses—in the public 
schools.
21
   Its purpose was one wholly consistent with French laïcité,
22
 namely, to preserve the 
public sphere as a secular one, in which persons interact as equal citizens without regard to 
sectarian identities, religious or ethnic.  Yet given the political context,
23
 and obvious French 
antipathy towards Muslims (not to mention the history of French anti-semitism), it is tempting to 
think of this law as a surreptitious assault on the basic protections of religious toleration.  But 
                                                 
20
 That fact might be thought to lend support to the Eisgruber and Sager argument discussed earlier (supra 
n. __).  But the question there was whether vulnerability to discrimination was adequate to mark out religion as 
deserving special legal protection, and the answer to that question is unaffected by the fact that religion, like so 
many other kinds of human beliefs and practices, may be susceptible to discrimination:  what matters for the point in 
the text is that religion is vulnerable to discrimination, not that it is especially or uniquely so vulnerable. 
21
 Law No. 2004-228 of March 15, 2004, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official 
Gazette of France], March 17, 2004, p. 5190; see also French Scarf Ban Comes Into Force, BBC NEWS EUROPE, 
September 2, 2004,  http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/3619988.stm (last visited December 5, 2010). 
22
 The 1958 French Constitution provides in Article 1 that, “France shall be an indivisible, secular, 
democratic and social Republic” [cite], while the French Law of 1905 makes clear in Article 1 that “free exercise of 
religion” is guaranteed, “under restrictions prescribed by the interest in public order” and Article 2 provides that the 
Republic “does not recognize, remunerate, or subsidize any religious denomination.”  See generally, Mukul Saxena, 
The French Headscarf Law and the Right to Manifest Religious Belief, 84 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 765, 769 -
71 (2007). 
 
23
T. Jeremy Gunn, Religious Freedom and Laïcité: A Comparison of the United States and France, 2004 
B.Y.U. L. REV. 419, 456 -57 (noting that “the headscarf is increasingly seen as the symbol of a foreign people--with 
a foreign religion--who have come to France, but who do not wish to integrate themselves fully into French life or 
accept French values,” and that “just before the events in 2003 that raised the headscarf to a sensational media issue, 
some leading French legal scholars suggested the possibility that the real concern regarding the Islamic headscarf 
may not be related to high principles of a neutral republican education in public schools, but a deeper unease about 
Islam.”).  See also Daniel Williams, In France, Students Observe Headscarf Ban, WASH. POST, Sept. 3, 2004, at 
A11 (“Critics condemned the law as an attack on religious freedom and said it would stigmatize the estimated 5 
milllion Muslims in France. Some Muslim groups pledged further protests, calling the restriction anti-Islamic.”); 
Elaine Sciolino, Ban on Head Scarves Takes Effect in a United France, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2004, at A8 (“Although 
the ban on „conspicious religious symbols also applies to Jewish skullcaps and large Christian crosses, there w as 
never any doubt that it was primarily aimed at France‟s five million Muslims and what is widely perceived as 
creeping fundamentalism in their midst.”). 
 
 
notice—and this might seem, at first blush, the important point here--that such an assault would 
be effectively defeated by a legal regime that recognized religious exemptions from generally 
applicable laws. 
 Of course, it is precisely the point of the French conception of laïcité to reject such 
exemptions, in favor of an ideal of equal citizenry of persons qua persons.  But more 
importantly, the real objection here is not to the absence of exemptions for claims of religious 
conscience from generally applicable laws, but rather to the fact that the law in question seems a 
mere subterfuge for a morally impermissible motive or purpose, namely, the motive or purpose 
of not  tolerating a particular religion, namely, Islam.   If there are good moral arguments for 
liberty of conscience—precisely the view defended in Chapter 1—then those arguments must 
surely rule out the persecution of particular claims of religious conscience, not because they are 
religious, but because they are claims of conscience.   The only question about the French law 
banning head scarves then is whether it is animated by intolerance towards Islam, not whether it 
reflects the drawbacks of a system that lacks exemptions for claims of religious conscience. 
 Can we dismiss the preceding concerns quite so easily?   The argument for liberty of 
conscience, to repeat, demands toleration of claims of conscience, but the No Exemptions 
approach says that the law need not carve out exemptions from generally applicable laws for 
claims of conscience.  The worry, then, is that the requirement of toleration will amount to little 
in practice.   Could not the state simply burden any disfavored claim of conscience under the 
guise of pursuing a general objective?   In the case of French laïcité, the problem is even worse 
than that, since the general objective in question is one that is not neutral about religion, but 
specifically deems religious attributes ones that do not belong in the public sphere.  Is not 
exclusion from the public sphere in this manner itself a pernicious burden? 
 It is important to keep the two issues separate.  One worry (the focus so far) is that a No 
Exemptions approach makes it too easy for states to burden conscience under the guise of 
pursuing neutral objectives.  The second (and new) worry is that the objective of excluding 
religion from the public sphere (in the manner of French laïcité) is, itself, inherently intolerant, 
and so impermissible.   
 The first worry raises only an epistemic or evidential issue.  After all, it has been the 
baseline premise of the argument of this book that of course state action whose aim is to burden 
particular religious claims of conscience is inconsistent with the moral requirement of toleration!  
Any prohibition, in any area of law, on particular state purposes will raise evidential questions 
about how to identify cases where the forbidden purpose is really at work.  On its face, it seems 
odd to think that the correct response to an evidential problem is an exemption from the law that 
is not otherwise morally justified.  To be sure, if we thought the evidential problem were 
insurmountable—that is, if we had reason to think that it will be impossibly difficult to 
discriminate between the façade of neutral purpose and actual neutral purpose in legislation that 
burdens religion—then we might think exemptions for religious claims of conscience the 
preferable approach, notwithstanding the inequality such an approach entails and 
notwithstanding the burden on the general welfare.  But notice that this style of argument could 
equally well propel us back to general exemptions for claims of conscience, to the extent we 
thought the façade of neutral purpose could regularly cover over the attempt to persecute non-
religious claims of conscience as well. 
 What, then, of the second worry?  Is French laïcité in its very nature impermissibly 
intolerant by excluding religion from the public sphere?   Does not the legal judgment that, in the 
public square, the equality of persons qua persons demands that they shed the visible indicia of 
their religious identities constitute intolerance of religion inconsistent with the arguments of 
Chapter 1?  The immediate answer might seem to “no,” since the Rawlsian and Millian 
arguments of Chapter 1 only established that there is a good moral case for liberty of conscience, 
not that such liberty could only be realized in the public arena.  It is one thing for the state to 
criminalize a particular religion and its practice, quite another for the state to say that the religion 
and its practices do not belong in the public schools.   Is not my liberty of conscience intact if I 
may proseltyze my neighbors and teach my children the purported truths of dialectical 
materialism or Hayekian free market utopianism, for example, even though I may not usurp the 
public school curriculum for the same philosophical program?    
 Of course, that is not quite the burden involved in French laïcité.  The more precise 
analogue would be the situation where the state declares that one may not even act or dress in 
such a way in the public schools as to evince one‟s allegiance to the forbidden ideologies, 
whether Islam or Christianity, Leninism or Hayekianism.  No veils, no yarmulkes, no 
ostentatious crosses, and no hammer-and-sickle or “greed is good” T-shirts:  that would 
constitute the relevantly analogous regulation.  Would such a prohibition constitute 
impermissible intolerance? 
What Precisely Does Toleration Require? 
 This question brings to the fore an important issue so far unaddressed explicitly in the 
argument of the book.   The intolerant want to “stamp out” disfavored beliefs and practices, and 
we have adduced, in Chapter 1, moral arguments against intolerance (limited, of course, by the 
Harm Principle).  But is the protection against intolerance exhausted by a mere prohibition on 
annihilation or imprisonment of those with the disfavored beliefs and practices?  Does the state 
discharge its obligation of toleration if it simply refrains from murdering or jailing those in the 
grips of “disreputable” claims of conscience?  Surely there are other ways for a state to be 
intolerant, but this gets us to the real challenge posed by French laïcité. 
 Let us shift our focus, for a moment, from religion to political speech.  The French, like 
many European countries, impose legal restrictions on public (and even private) advocacy of and 
displays of Nazism.
24
  Wearing Nazi regalia in the public schools, or anywhere in public, would 
quite clearly incur legal sanction in most of the countries that survived the horrors of the Nazi 
era.   These laws are quite clearly “intolerant” of Nazism, and, equally clearly, they infringe on 
matters of conscience, albeit matters of depraved conscience.  One need only recall Hitler‟s 
conduct towards the end of World War II—when he insisted on diverting manpower and 
resources to the extermination of the Jews, rather than freeing the manpower up to fight the war 
and utilizing the Jews as slave labor
25—to realize that Hitler was a man of principle, who 
pursued the objectives he thought morally correct and obligatory, notwithstanding the 
consequences.   Moral philosophers have recently called attention to the extent to which the 
street-level perpetrators of Nazi horrors were men (and sometime women) of conscience, also 
acting in accordance with their sense, however warped, of moral duty.
26
 
 If people act on the basis of their “Nazi conscience,” does liberty of conscience require us 
to acquiesce?  It quite obviously does not, for reasons that we emphasized in Chapter 1:  namely, 
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that a principle of toleration operates under the side-constraints imposed by something like the 
Harm Principle.
27
  The state is under no moral obligation to tolerate acts of conscience that cause 
harm to other persons.   But that does not get us very far with the current question, since typical 
European restrictions on “Nazi speech” are blanket bans on speech and symbols, not simply on 
actions.   The European legal restrictions on even the expression of Nazism reflect some 
combination of the judgments that:  (1) such expressions run too great a risk of harm to humans, 
and (2) Nazism is akin to the denial of geometrical truths (to borrow the preferred Millian 
analogy
28), that is, it represents a set of ideas about which (to quote Mill) “there is nothing at all 
to be said on the wrong side of the question.  The peculiarity of the evidence…is that all the 
argument is on one side,” 29  which is to say, not the Nazi side. I shall refer to the first 
consideration justifying a limitation on liberty of conscience as the “Risk of Harm” 
consideration; and I shall refer to the second as the “Falsehoods Need Not Be Heard” 
consideration (though really we are talking only about clear or obvious or indisputable 
falsehoods only).   Does either consideration have any bearing on whether a regime like French 
laïcité constitutes morally impermissible intolerance of religion? 
 The actually existing French regime of laïcité obviously can not be justified on the 
grounds that Falsehoods Need Not Be Heard, since that would require a much more far-reaching 
set of restrictions on religious expression, that go well beyond the desire to preserve the public 
sphere as one in which citizens interact as equal citizens, without regard to sectarian identities.  If 
burdens on Islamic headscarves and Jewish skull-caps were to be justified on the grounds that 
Falsehoods Need Not Be Heard, then Catholic Churches, Islamic Mosques, and Jewish 
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Synagogues would obviously need to be shut down as well, and Bibles, Korans, and Torahs 
would need to be confiscated, but that is no part of the program of French laïcité.
30
 
 That means the only colorable defense of French laïcité, from the standpoint of principled 
toleration, is one based on Risk of Harm considerations.  If religious expression is to be treated 
like Nazi expression in the public sphere (consistently with the constraints imposed by the 
principle of toleration), then it must be because the risk of harm associated with religious 
expression is on a par with the risk (if not the harm) associated with religious expression.   It 
bears emphasizing at this point that there are two components to what is at issue here:  the risk 
and the harm.   The harm in question is the transformation of the public sphere from one in 
which persons interact qua persons, to one in which they interact on the basis of religious 
identities.  That risk is very real, as experience in the United States would suggest--where, for 
example, the vast majority of the population reports that they would never vote for an atheist for 
elective office, but express much higher levels of tolerance for (i.e., willingness to support for 
elective office) gay men and women, Moslems, and Jews.
31
 Yet even in the U.S., this antipathy 
towards atheism does not manifest itself (at least not yet) in the burnings of heretics or the legal 
persecution of non-believers.  Yet lesser, but still real, harms are apparent from the hyper-
religiosity of the United States, such as the assault on science curricula in the public schools.  
(As we will argue below, the state can, quite consistently with principled toleration, disestablish 
religion from the public schools.) 
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Penny Edgell, Joseph Gerteis, and Douglas Hartmann, Atheists As “Other”: Moral Boundaries and 
Cultural Membership in American Society, 71 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 211, 215 (2006) (Noting that “the gap in 
willingness to vote for atheists versus other religious minorities . . . is large and persistent,” and that in surveys 
fewer than half of respondents expressed willingness to vote for an open atheist). 
 Remember, of course, that the moral magnitude of the harm still remains at issue.  No 
one doubts that those in thrall to Nazi claims of conscience will act, to the extent they can, in 
ways that really harm human beings.   The harm at issue in the case of religious invasion of the 
public sphere is far different:  not ordinarily to physical well-being, but, in the first instance, to a 
moral ideal of equal citizenship.  The denial, de facto if not de jure, of full equal citizenship 
might lead to more tangible blood-and-flesh harms, but the prediction that it will do so is 
considerably more speculative, and not obviously adequate to support a Harm Principle 
argument in the spirit of Mill (even allowing for the ambiguities of what constitutes “harm” in a 
Millian framework).   The only Risk of Harm to which the French approach can reliably advert is 
the risk of increased false belief, but that, as we have already seen in Chapter 4, is not obviously 
a harm, since false beliefs often have salutary effects (they are, as Nietzsche says, sometimes 
conditions of life itself), both for their adherents and sometimes for others. 
 The conclusion, then, seems clear:  French laïcité is, in fact, a case of impermissible 
intolerance of religion, unless one were to assume, contrary to reality, that most religions 
burdened by it were akin to Nazism.   But that also means that the No Exemptions approach to 
principled toleration is incompatible with a regime like that of French laïcité.   In fact, this 
should not be a surprising conclusion, since the central contention of the No Exemptions 
approach is that there do not need to be exemptions for claims of conscience from laws with 
neutral objectives.   The “neutrality” of objectives required, it now seems, requires neutrality as 
to dictates of conscience that do not violate the Harm Principle.
32
  Since it can not be maintained 
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 In the next section, we shall return to an important qualification of this claim.  It is one thing to be 
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that religious dictates of conscience, in general, violate the Harm Principle, a general ban on the 
expressions of such claims of conscience in the public sphere can not be justified.  (More 
carefully tailored bans on particular claims of religious conscience might be justified, but that is 
a different question.)  It is not enough for toleration of conscience that the state not jail or 
annihilate the adherents of the disfavored claims of conscience; the state must also not directly 
target or coercively burden their claims of conscience, unless they run afoul of the Harm 
Principle—more precisely unless they pose Risk of Harm or constitute Falsehoods That Need 
Not Be Heard.   These points, however, are no objection to the No Exemptions approach except 
in the unusual circumstances in which we think the evidential question about whether the state is 
really pursuing permissible, neutral purposes can not be answered, in which case the default 
position would be suspicion of any law that burdens conscience.   But that does not appear to be 
our world—at least not yet—and so the No Exemptions approach stands, even if it is not 
compatible with French laïcité. 
Religious Toleration and Religious Establishment 
 Our primary focus so far has been on the interaction between the requirements of a  
principle of toleration and exemptions from generally applicable laws that infringe on claims of 
conscience—what, in the United States, would be known as “free exercise” issues.   But any 
conception of religious liberty must also address issues of religious establishment, that is, issues 
about the state endorsement of a particular religion, or of religion as against non-religion, or even 
of non-religion as against religion.  How does religious establishment interact with religious 
liberty and with the moral requirements imposed by a principle of toleration? 
 We have already broached this issue, in part, through the preceding discussion of French 
laïcité.  French laïcité represents a particular kind of disestablishment of religion, excluding, as it 
does, religious expression and symbols from much of the public sphere--an exclusion that, as we 
argued above, can not be justified on Harm Principle grounds, and thus seems to constitute a 
burden on conscience inconsistent with principled toleration.  But it does not follow from this 
that disestablishment of religion in favor of non-religion is inconsistent with principled 
toleration.   After all, liberal states necessarily disestablish all illiberal claims of conscience by 
putting the imprimatur of the state on equality, on democracy, on liberty, and so on—though they 
do not go the intolerant step further of forbidding all expression in the public sphere of illiberal 
ideas, except when those ideas are likely (perhaps imminently likely) to result in actions that 
violate the Harm Principle.    
But most liberal states go a step beyond that, also putting the imprimatur of the state, for 
example, on science as a reliable source of knowledge about the natural world, as reflected in the 
curricula of the public schools, or by using public monies to fund medical research and 
procedures to which some taxpayers object “as a matter of conscience.”33  I shall argue that, 
consistent with a principle of toleration, the state may indeed puts its imprimatur on values and 
world-views that are inconsistent with the claims of conscience of some of its citizens (as long as 
its objective in doing so is not to suppress or coercively burden those claims of conscience but to 
achieve some conception of the good—a point to which we shall return).  The state, consistent 
with the principle of toleration, may even disestablish religion, though not in the manner of 
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sometimes restricting access to public money for well-established medical procedures and research because it 
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French laïcité.   These conclusions will no doubt be congenial to religion skeptics, but it bears 
emphasizing that the arguments apply equally well in a different direction:  nothing in the 
principle of toleration is incompatible with state establishment of religion, as long as it is done in 
such a way that it does not burden non-religious claims of conscience--except, of course, to the 
extent that such coercive burdens can be justified on Harm Principle grounds (either because of 
the Risk of Harm or because of the Falsehoods Need Not Be Heard rationales
34
). 
 Let us start with establishment of religion.   Many Western democracies, such as England 
and Germany, have established religions, and yet have robust regimes of liberty of conscience, in 
which a range of moral and political views find expression in the public sphere that are unknown 
in countries like the United States, which do not establish any religion.   (Such natural 
experiments should perhaps serve as cautionary notes to anyone who thinks a legal regime plays 
a significant causal role in constituting the moral culture of a nation.)   What we learned from 
consideration of the case of French laïcité is that establishment of what I will call henceforth “a 
Vision of Conscience”--a vision, broadly speaking, of what is good and worthwhile35--is 
compatible with toleration, as long as it does not have as its purpose to burden coercively 
minority claims of conscience, beyond what would be licensed by the Harm Principle.   The 
problem with French laïcité is that it wants to establish a particular Vision of Conscience—of 
persons as equal qua persons, without regard to religion or ethnicity—through coercion of those 
with minority claims of religious conscience, and in a way that can not be justified on Harm 
Principle grounds.  Religious symbols worn by students in the public schools simply do not 
undermine democratic equality, except on fantastically paranoid assumptions about human 
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psychology and sociology, and that is true even if the French state might be quite justified, 
consistent with a principle of toleration, in, for example, suppressing the hate speech of an Imam 
who claimed that all non-Muslims were infidels who should be murdered.
36
  Without a doubt, it 
would be consistent with principled toleration for the French government to teach secularism in 
the public schools, to affirm the secular character of the Republic in its public pronouncements, 
and to allocate its resources in a way consistent with these objectives.  What it can not do, 
consistent with principled toleration, is try to shut down private citizens who would express a 
different Vision of Conscience. 
British establishment of Anglicanism provides the natural counterpoint to French laïcité, 
as an example of an establishment of a religious Vision of Conscience that does not impinge on 
the principle of toleration.  Anglican Christianity is the “official” religion of Britain—it is 
literally “the Church of England”—which means Anglican prayers and liturgies are customary 
features of public life, and at least the royal family still professes allegiance to the Church.   But 
no one can doubt that modern Britain adheres to principled toleration when it comes to other 
religions:  there are no religious tests for the holding of public office; sectarian religious schools 
in non-Anglican traditions actually receive public funding; other religious traditions are 
guaranteed the right to practice their religions; and no non-Anglican religious practices are 
criminalized or otherwise suppressed.   Perhaps this is a peculiar artifact of English culture—
after all, as my English friends like to point out, it‟s not really clear that the Archbishop of 
Canterbury even believes in God—but even so, it is a clear case of religious establishment that 
seems fully compatible with the requirements of toleration of non-established religions.   
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 It is almost certainly justifiable for a state to prohibit school teachers from wearing religious garb, as 
Germany does.  See _________________________________.  And see the discussion, below, regarding what it 
means for the state to endorse a Vision of Conscience. 
If religious establishment can be compatible with principled toleration, so too can 
religious disestablishment, as long as it does not target for suppression or coercive burdens 
religious or non-religious claims of conscience—except, to repeat, when warranted by the Harm 
Principle.  The state may endorse a Vision of Conscience according to which religious 
explanations for the origin of human life are mythologies that have no place in the public 
schools, but what they may not do is prevent the creationists and Intelligent Design proponents 
from articulating those views in private and in public (if not in the state schools).  The French 
state could even endorse the ideal of citizens interacting as equals qua citizens, without regard to 
race or religious or ethnicity, but what it can not do is prevent citizens from displaying their 
religious convictions in public (as little as it would be justified in preventing them from 
displaying their ethnicity or race in public). 
There will remain, to be sure, fuzzy boundary cases involved in the idea that the state 
may endorse a Vision of Conscience but not suppress the expression of contrary visions.  Some 
state endorsements may crowd out private expressions of contrary visions, for example, a worry 
that may be especially serious where the media of communication are under state control.   (On 
the other hand, Britain is, again, a counter-example to this concern.)  But even allowing for hard 
cases, it seems clear that, in principle, there is no incompatibility between state endorsement of a 
Vision of Conscience—religious or irreligious—and the demands of principled toleration.37   
Principled toleration requires the state not to persecute or target for special burdens particular 
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claims of conscience; it does not require the state to cease being a state, i.e., to cease promoting a 
Vision of Conscience, of the public good, social welfare, or human fulfillment.
38
 
American constitutional law has recently confronted a version of this problem in the 
context of the “viewpoint discrimination” revolution in Establishment Clause jurisprudence.   
The U.S. Supreme Court had, for some time, interpreted the constitutional prohibition on an 
“establishment” of religion as forbidding laws requiring “excessive entanglement” with 
religion.
39
  The meaning of that prohibition was also for a generation or so moderately clear:  it 
meant that state-supported schools could not, for example, let their facilities be utilized by 
sectarian religious groups promoting a sectarian, religious message.  This was a kind of 
disestablishment:  it said that state schools were off-limits to those who would promote religion.  
This disestablishment co-existed, of course, with secure protections for both religious expression 
in private life and the advocacy of religious claims in other public spaces, such as the media and 
the proverbial “public square.”   
In the 1980s, conservative religious groups began litigating against such prohibitions, 
arguing that they were unconstitutional “viewpoint discrimination” by the state:  if state schools 
open their after-school facilities or otherwise offer support to various viewpoints (e.g., the animal 
rights group, or the College Republicans, or the local chapter of the Socialist Workers Party), 
then it is an unconstitutional violation of freedom of speech to prohibit religious groups from 
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utilizing those facilities on the grounds that their viewpoint is religious.
40
  But if the preceding 
argument of this chapter is correct, then disestablishment of religion by barring the use of public 
schools by religious groups is morally consistent with principled toleration.   The state can 
establish a Vision of Conscience which does not include religion, meaning that state schools 
need not accommodate religious expression, contrary to the wrong turn taken by the U.S. 
Supreme Court; what the state can not do, consistent with a principle of toleration, is deny 
individuals the opportunity to express in other aspects of their life a religiously-grounded Vision 
of Conscience. 
But what precisely is the difference between saying, “You may not use public school 
facilities to teach a particular religious dogma” and saying, “You may not appear in a public 
school wearing clothing that reflects your religious beliefs”?  After all, French laïcité targets the 
latter, as well as the former, but now it appears we are claiming there is a morally pertinent 
difference between the cases.  And, indeed, there is, though, as in all these cases, some of the 
differences are ones of degree, rather than kind.   The argument so far has been that the state 
must, of course, express a Vision of Conscience, and that it can do so consistent with principled 
toleration as long as its aim is not to suppress or coercively burden individual claims of 
conscience.   But why does it constitute an impermissible burden on my religious Vision of 
Conscience to forbid me from wearing a Jewish skull-cap in the public school, but it does not 
constitute an impermissible burden on my religious Vision of Conscience to forbid me from 
teaching the truths of the Torah in the public schools? 
If states can—indeed, must—promote Visions of Conscience, then states must be able to 
manifest their endorsement of the Vision.  One way in which all states do so is through their 
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educational systems, and through what can and can not be taught to the students in the system.   
Suppose a particular sect believed that the sun revolves around the earth, and that it would offend 
the dignity of God, who made man in his image, to claim otherwise.   If the state turns its science 
classrooms over to the teaching of this view—even as one view among many that students might 
consider—it would, on any reasonable, interpretation undermine its endorsement of the 
Copernican vision of the solar system.  Words matter, and words spoken by agents of the state 
matter, at least insofar as they communicate, quite clearly, the Vision of the Conscience the state 
endorses.   
But suppose our anti-Copernican sect issued a distinctive shirt to its adherents, say, one 
with a picture of the solar system with the earth in the center.   If the state permits students in the 
public schools to wear that shirt, would anyone reasonably infer that the state endorse the anti-
Copernican vision of the world?  It is hard to see how that conclusion would be warranted, when 
the school as a whole—its curriculum, its books, and its facilities—are given over to teaching the 
Copernican conception.   
This argument depends, of course, on background assumptions about the significance of 
different forms of expression, verbal and sartorial.  One could imagine local cultural norms 
sufficiently different from ours such that if the public schools permitted someone to appear 
wearing a Jewish skull-cap, it was tantamount to the state endorsing Judaism.  But at least in the 
Western democracies, that does not appear to be the status quo with respect to our background 
norms.  Conversely, one could imagine a society in which cultural norms view the public schools 
not as the agents of state endorsement, but as akin to public parks, and so the fact that after-
school facilities were turned over to the anti-Copernicans would not in any way be inconsistent 
with the state‟s endorsement of the Copernican vision.  Any plausible conception of which 
regulations impermissibly coerce or burden claims of conscience must be similarly attuned to 
local cultural norms.   
It may be worth pausing to consider the contrary scenario to the American one prior to 
the “viewpoint discrimination” revolution—that is, a scenario in which the state, instead of 
disestablishing religion in the public schools, rather endorses a particular religion, say, 
Catholicism, and thus declines to let funding for public education be utilized for supporting 
Hinduism or atheism.  Thus, in this alternative scenario, public school facilities would be 
available to the Catholic Student Society, but not to the Hindus or the atheists or perhaps even to 
the Republicans!
41
   Can a state promote a Catholic Vision of Conscience this way consistent 
with the demands of principled toleration?   
Let us assume that the background cultural norms are the same, in the sense that public 
schools which permit students to wear sectarian clothing of any kind are not understood to 
endorse that sect, and in which the content of the public school curriculum, by contrast, is 
generally understood to reflect the state‟s endorsement of a Vision of Conscience.   And let us 
suppose that our counterfactual society permits the public expression of Hinduism, atheism, 
Calvinism; indeed, permits parents to send their children to appropriate sectarian schools in lieu 
of the public schools; indeed, in the manner of Britain, funds these „alternative‟ schools.  It is 
hard to see how such a society could be deemed to run afoul of the requirements of principled 
toleration.
42
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 There might seem to be a problem in the case of the establishment of particular religions, like 
Catholicism, that is not at issue in the case of the establishment of, at least, atheism.  The problem pertains to the 
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reason is concerned with what one ought to believe, practical reason with what one ought to do.   Religious systems 
of belief, like Catholicism, typically conjoin them:  one ought not abort fetuses because one ought to believe that the 
fetus incorporates a God-given soul, and one ought not destroys God‟s creations.  In consequence, the establishment 
of Catholicism will, inevitably, reach into private action in ways that increase the risk of coercive burdens on 
conscience:  to establish Catholicism it is not enough to teach in the public schools what children ought to believe, 
The U.S. Supreme Court has often emphasized, quite reasonably, the “coercive” effect of 
certain practices in the public schools on children,
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 a worry wholly consistent with the earlier 
emphasis on local cultural norms in assessing the coercive or burdensome significance of 
particular regulations.   But informal social norms are all important in this context.   I am 
reminded of a story my father, now in his late 70s, told me.  Raised in a religious Jewish family, 
he became, notwithstanding, an atheist at the age of four, and yet was subjected to years of 
public schooling—in Brooklyn, New York, no less during the 1930s and 1940s—in which daily 
readings and prayers from the King James Bible were common.  Perhaps my father was sui 
generis, but it was not like New York City became a center of Protestant revivalism in the 1950s 
and 1960s among former Jews.   I think the explanation is obvious:  the whole cultural context of 
these ludicrous Bible-reading rituals was guaranteed to undermine their impact.  And, of course, 
it was not just the public schools, but the public culture of the nation as a whole that was in-your-
face Protestant.  And yet it all had no impact on the liberty of conscience of a youngster in New 
York City, where it was easier to find Trotskyites to discuss ideas with than it was to find 
Baptists. 
                                                                                                                                                             
but also how they ought to act, and, in particular, how they ought to act in matters far removed from anything that 
might otherwise be a subject of the public school curriculum.  Yet atheism, on its fact, seems to only impose a 
demand of theoretical reason:  one should not believe in God.   But practical reason is, of course, always responsive 
to claims of theoretical reason, so if the state endorses a claim of theoretical reason to the effect that God does not 
exist that can not avoid affecting the practical reason of any citizens who think the existence of God is relevant to 
what ought to be done.  In the end, then, I am not sure the establishment of Catholicism will really be different in 
kind from the establishment of atheism.  There is, as Nietzsche well understood, a kind of unity of theoretical and 
practical reason, though not the kind Kant imagined:   the overvaluation of truth characteristic of the post-Christian 
West means that the “truth” about matters is typically thought to be significant in practical reasoning about what 
ought to be done.   One need only read the polemics of “New Atheist” writers like Richard Dawkins to see this 
clearly. 
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 See, e.g., Santa Fe Independent School Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 291 (2000) (rejecting the argument 
that prayer delivered over a public address system prior to high school football games is not “coercive” because 
attendance at the games is voluntary); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 588 (1992) (referring to the “subtle coercive 
pressures” present in prayers at a high school graduation ceremony). 
But what, then, of the same youngster in Texas or Arkansas?  The problem in those cases 
was surely the interaction of the state endorsement of religion with the local cultural norms:  the 
dominance of Protestantism in the communities, the oppressive homogeneity of the public 
culture, the rhetoric of politicians and community leaders, all would serve to reinforce the 
message of the Bible reading, and so would turn what was slightly ludicrous and irrelevant in 
Brooklyn in the 1930s into something perniciously coercive.  To be sure, that means if we are 
looking for a national standard for what is permissible in the public schools, then the default 
position, required by principled toleration, is one in which Bible readings are off limits, even if 
today, as then, there will be communities in which the effect of such a practice would be to 
encourage irreligion and ridicule of religion.  So while establishment of religion or irreligion can 
both be compatible with principled toleration, assessing whether it is so will require case-by-case 
judgments in light of the prevailing cultural norms of the communities affected. 
It is very important to emphasize at this stage in the argument that whether we should 
prefer a state that establishes Catholicism or Hinduism rather than atheism is a wholly separate 
moral question.  The argument so far has only been that such establishments can be compatible 
with principled toleration.  One might think that establishment of a Vision of Conscience, 
religious or irreligious, ought to turn on whether that Vision is a proper object of Appraisal 
Respect.  As we learned in Chapter 4, however, religion per se is not a likely candidate for 
Appraisal Respect, which might be a fatal obstacle to defending any kind of religious 
establishment even if such establishment were compatible with principled toleration.
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  We have 
not, to be sure, made the argument that irreligion, in the form of atheism or otherwise, is in fact a 
proper object of Appraisal Respect, and so nothing in the preceding argument should be taken to 
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 Perhaps, though, particular religions are candidates for Appraisal Respect.  Nothing in the argument of 
Chapter 4 rules out that possibility. 
have made the case for the establishment of irreligion either.  All we have shown, if the 
argument has been convincing, is that religious establishment and religious disestablishment can 
both be compatible, under the right conditions, with principled toleration. 
A Final Rejoinder to the No Exemptions Approach:  “There are only religious claims of 
conscience” 
 So far, we have pressed the proposition that the No Exemptions approach to claims of 
conscience, religious or otherwise, is the one most consistent with fairness (given the 
practicalities of enforcement), with the very concept of law, and with the necessity for states to 
endorse a Vision of Conscience.  But a final worry no doubt looms:  for are not religious claims 
of conscience especially resilient and fierce, especially likely to provoke backlash, disobedience, 
and the proverbial “blood in the streets”?  After all, if your sense of categorical obligation—the 
hallmark of a claim of conscience—is also conjoined with concern for the well-being of your 
soul not just now, or tomorrow, but for all eternity, then you will not accept interference with 
your obligations lightly.  In short, perhaps the real reason to think that principled toleration of 
religious claims of conscience deserve special consideration is because they are the ones least 
likely to accede to a No Exemptions regime? 
 A suitable response to this worry must start by remembering that it is not the case that the 
“eternal well-being of the soul” is a distinctive aspect of religious categorical commands—some 
religious sects emphasize that, some do not.   So the worry that categorical commands will, 
necessarily, be taken more seriously by the religious than the non-religious can not be right.  
Indeed, the whole idea that categorical demands are taken more seriously by the religious than 
the non-religious is one we rejected, effectively, in Chapter 2.   Recall that if one looks at 
horrifically oppressive political environments, like Nazi Germany in the 1930s--environments 
that would seem well-positioned as „natural experiments‟ for weeding out real claim of 
conscience (ones experienced as categorical) from the pretenders, that is, those who relinquish 
their “obligations” in the face of drastic consequences—what one finds is that religious believers 
are among those who “risk everything” to do what is right, but so too are many non-religious 
believers, such as communists.  That certain human beings are capable of experiencing certain 
demands as categorical is an important psychological fact about creatures like us, to which law 
must be sensitive.  That psychological fact, however, does not track religious belief. 
 So the initial worry should really be different:  not that religious believers will respond to 
a No Exemptions approach with “blood in the streets,” but rather that in any society, there will 
be some conscientious individuals who will not comply with generally applicable laws that 
offend their conscience.  That is surely right, but it constitutes no argument against the No 
Exemptions approach.  We can as little justify exemptions from generally applicable laws to 
“those most likely to make trouble” as we can justify exemptions from those laws to “those who 
have religious claims of conscience.”  Sometimes those with claims of religions conscience may 
be quite correct to resist the law, but that is wholly independent of the question whether the law 
ought to exempt them from its application.  It has been the argument of this book that principled 
toleration does not require that we do so.  Toleration may be a virtue, both in individuals and in 
states, but its selective application to the conscience of only religious believers is not morally 
defensible. 
 
